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STATE UNITARY BUSINESS TAXATION: ARE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS BEING
SUBJECTED TO AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX?
Due to inflation and tax measures such as California's Proposi-
tion 13, many state governments found themselves lacking neces-
sary funds. In an attempt to replenish their depleted budgets, sev-
eral states adopted the unitary method for taxing corporations.
Heavily criticized by the multijurisdictional corporations from its
beginning, the unitary method has reached the forefront of inter-
national trade conflicts. This Comment examines the constitution-
ality of the unitary method as it is applied to corporations with
foreign parents. In addition, the Comment discusses the constitu-
tionality of preemptive federal legislation barring the unitary
method and proposes a solution for striking the delicate balance
between states' rights and the need for strong foreign trade.
INTRODUCTION
The States' power to tax corporate income is constitutionally lim-
ited to that portion of a corporation's income derived from within the
State's jurisdiction." Difficulties are encountered when a state taxing
authority seeks to equitably allocate the income of a corporation op-
erating through branches or subsidiaries in several taxing jurisdic-
tions.2 The States have employed two methods for dividing income
among the multiple taxing jurisdictions: the arms-length (or separate
accounting) method, and the unitary business apportionment
method. 3
1. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 430 (1980); Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
The following terms will be used frequently:
To "allocate" means to attribute the income to a specific state. For example, a corpo-
ration operating in only a single state will have its income allocated to that state.
There are three methods employed to allocate the income of multijurisdictional corpo-
rations. Specific allocation, which is not widely used, attempts to allocate the income to a
specific "source" state. Separate accounting relies on the corporation's accounting and
allocates the income among the jurisdictions as it was treated by the corporation. Appor-
tionment is the third method used and involves applying a formula to the entire income
of the corporation to determine each state's individual tax base.
2. See Comment, State Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 50 U. COLO. L.
REV. 499 (1979).
3. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations and the Su-
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The objective under the arms-length method is to allocate to each
subsidiary that portion of profit which it would have earned had it
been dealing at arms-length with other members of the corporate
group.4 Critics of the method contend it forces the State to assume a
fictitious arrangement because dealings between members of the
same corporate group are seldom carried on at prices reflecting true
market conditions. 5 Additionally, the critics claim the method pro-
duces so many problems when applied at the federal level that it
would be virtually impossible to operate at the state level.6 Finally,
manipulation within the corporate group requires frequent readjust-
ment by the taxing authority.7 Despite these problems, the arms-
length method has become the internationally accepted apportion-
ment method, employed by the United States Government and most
trading nations.8
Twenty-six states employ the unitary business apportionment
method (in some form) 9 to determine the tax base of the subsidiary
operating within the unitary tax jurisdiction. The taxing authority
must first determine whether the subsidiary is actually engaged in a
"unitary business" with other members of the corporate group before
the subsidiary in the taxing state is subject to unitary apportion-
ment.10 This initial determination has fostered considerable contro-
preme Court, 35 NAT'L TAx J. 401 (1982).
4. See Comment, supra note 2, at 501.
5. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circum-
scription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487 (1968).
6. HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RECOMMEN-
DATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME (Comm. Print 1977).
7. Comment, supra note 2, at 502. See also 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1976) and 26
C.F.R. § 1.482-1 (1983).
Because multinational corporations might, through dealing at prices unreflective of
true market conditions, manipulate income to avoid taxation, the federal tax scheme pro-
vides for readjustment by the taxing authority so that the returns reflect market prices.
8. 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1153.
9. UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 93 (West
1978). Sixteen states apply the unitary method to worldwide income.
10. The courts have accepted various definitions of "unitary business." For years
the most widely accepted and employed definition was the "three unities" test approved
in Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942). This test involved a showing of
(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of operation as evidenced by central purchasing, adver-
tising, accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity of use in its centralized force
and general system operation.
Another test that has been accepted is the "benefits of integral operation" criterion
developed in Western Auto Supply v. Comm'r of Taxation, 245 Minn. 346, 71 N.W.2d
797, 804-05 (1955). Additionally, the test employed by Pennsylvania, "the integral coor-
dination of various functions," has gained widespread acceptance. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Ford Motor, 350 Pa. 236, 38 A.2d 329 (1944).
Although the Supreme Court still acknowledges the "three unities test," the Court
recently has relied on the "functional integration" test. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
For a discussion of the tests and definitions used, see Note, State Taxation of Non-
domiciliary Corporations, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 191 (1983).
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versy because the definition of "unitary business" varies with each
taxing jurisdiction.11
Once the taxing authority establishes that the subsidiary is a
member of a unitary business, the apportionment formula is applied.
Most states apply the three-factor formula suggested by the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act.' 2 Under the Act, the sub-
sidiary's tax liability is based on a ratio of its sales, payroll and prop-
erty to the world-wide combined sales, payroll and property of the
entire corporate group.' 3 Critics assert the disproportionate values of
sales, property, and payroll present on the international level distort
the apportionment ratio and the subsidiary's tax liability.' 4 Addition-
ally, they charge that unitary apportionment discourages foreign in-
vestment,' 5 presents substantial administrative burdens,' 6 interferes
with federal foreign trade policy, and creates multiple taxation.17
The combination of increased tax liability inherent in the unitary
business principle'" and increased presence of multinational corpora-
tions has fostered recent constitutional challenges to unitary appor-
tionment before the United States Supreme Court.' 9 Corporations
have based their challenges on Due Process2" and Commerce
Clause2' restrictions on state taxation. To date, all the challenges
before the Supreme Court have been registered by domestic-based
multinational corporations. As exemplified by the most recent deci-
11. Comment, supra note 2, at 502-03.
12. 7A U.L.A. 93 (West 1978).
13. Id. For example, assume that a California subsidiary had 10 X in payroll, 100
X in sales, and 50 X in property and that the total corporate group had 100 X in payroll,
1000 X in sales, and 500 X in property. The income allocated to California under the
apportionment formula would be 1/10 of the total corporate income since the ratio is 160
X/1600 X.
14. J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 538 (4th
ed. 1978).
15. State Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Hearings on HR5076 Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 141-44 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings]; DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 242, G-7, G-8 (1983).
16. Note, Proposed Congressional Limitations on State Taxation of Multina-
tional Corporations, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 343, 353 (1981).
17. See Rudy, The California Unitary Tax Concept As Applied to the Worldwide
Activities of Foreign Corporations: A Modern Commerce Clause Analysis, 15 U.S.F.L.
REV. 371, 378 (1979).
18. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 4 (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
19. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27,
1983); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); Exxon Corp. v.
Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980).
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl, 3.
sion, Container Corporation v. Franchise Tax Board,22 the Supreme
Court has approved most applications of the unitary method to do-
mestic-based corporate groups. The states, however, have lost two
recent cases23 involving the determination of the unitary nature of
the business.
Presently, no domestic subsidiary of a foreign corporation has suc-
cessfully challenged unitary taxation before the Supreme Court. In
Container Corp., however, the Court expressly declined to extend its
holding to include subsidiaries with foreign parents.2 4 The Court im-
plied the analysis and result might have been altered were a foreign
parent involved.25 Considering the criteria set forth in Japan Line
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,28 some commentators have concluded
the Supreme Court would declare that the application of unitary ap-
portionment to foreign parents violates the negative implications of
the Commerce Clause.27
Part I of this Comment will analyze the recent challenges to uni-
tary taxation litigated before the Supreme Court and will determine
the tests the Court applies to challenges by corporations with domes-
tic parents. The section will then focus on the distinction between
these tests and those to be applied to corporations with foreign par-
ents. Part II will analyze problems incurred in establishing a judicial
forum, the likely result of the issue before the Supreme Court, and
the merits and disadvantages of selecting litigation as the method for
avoiding unitary taxation.
Congress has also considered the issue of limiting the states' taxa-
tion of foreign-based corporations.28 Additionally, President Reagan
has formed a task force to consider the possibility of limiting state
unitary taxation through national legislation or voluntary action by
the states.29 Part III examines the constitutionality of federal legisla-
tion limiting state taxing power, discusses the policy arguments for
both opponents and proponents of such legislation, and suggests a
resolution of the issues in light of the reasoning and conclusions of
Parts I and 11.30
22. 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983).
23. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
24. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4995 n.26.
25. Id. at 4997 n.32.
26. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
27. Rudy, supra note 17, at 373; DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 183, G-1
(1982).
The negative implications of the Commerce Clause prevent the states from placing an
undue burden on interstate commerce.
28. See House Hearings, supra note 15.
29. See DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 186, G-3 (1983).
30. Although issues of allocation of dividend income are present in some of the
principal cases, this Comment will not deal specifically with the taxation of dividends.
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PART I: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNITARY APPORTIONMENT
AS APPLIED TO DOMESTIC BASED PARENT CORPORATIONS
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has decided five cases regarding
the constitutionality of state unitary taxation of multinational corpo-
rations.31 Each of these cases involved an action brought by a domes-
tic-based parent corporation challenging a state tax assessment. This
portion of the Comment will analyze the constitutional arguments
presented by the corporations in the cases prior to Container, the
Supreme Court's resolution of those challenges, and the reasoning
employed in Container. Finally, it will distinguish between the tests
applied to corporations with domestic parents and those which
should be applied to corporations with foreign parents.
Due Process Considerations
In each of the above mentioned challenges, the taxpayer relied
upon Due Process Clause restrictions on state taxation. For example,
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes32 concerned Vermont's
application of the unitary business principle to foreign-source divided
income of Mobil, one of the world's largest integrated oil companies.
Mobil, a New York corporation, had operated abroad largely
through wholly owned subsidiaries. Vermont included in the appor-
tionment dividends from these foreign subsidiaries to determine Mo-
bil's taxable income. Mobil protested that the inclusion of these divi-
dends in its apportionable tax base was forbidden by Due Process
and Commerce Clause 3 considerations.
The Court declared two Due Process Clause limitations on state
taxation of income generated in interstate commerce. 34 First, to col-
lect income tax a "'minimal connection' between the intrastate ac-
tivities and the taxing state must exist."35 Second, there must exist a
"rational relationship between the income attributed to the State
31. See supra note 19. See also Note, State Taxation of Nondomiciliary Corpora-
tions, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 191 (1983).
32. 445 U.S. 425 (1980). See generally Killefer, State Taxation of Commerce:
Mobil Oil v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 8 J. CORP. TAx'N 3 (1981).
33. Discussion of the Commerce Clause considerations follows in the text accom-
panying notes 66-105.
Mobil argued that because the entire amount of the dividends would be taxed in the
state of incorporation, New York, it would violate due process for Vermont to be permit-
ted to tax Mobil on the apportioned value of the dividends.
34. 445 U.S. at 436.
35. Id. at 437.
and the intrastate values of the enterprise."3 6
The "minimal connection" or "nexus" is established when a mem-
ber of the corporate group carries on a business within the state.3 7
Mobil fulfilled this requirement by transacting a portion of its uni-
tary business (sale of petroleum products) within Vermont. Further-
more, Mobil and its subsidiaries were a "functionally integrated" en-
terprise, subject to treatment as a unitary business.38 The finding of
unitary business established a sufficient nexus between the state and
all of Mobil's income,39 although Mobil argued that the foreign
source of income did not arise from in-state activities. Thus, the
nexus requirement was satisfied by showing Mobil's enterprise was
functionally integrated.40
To fulfill the "rational relationship" standard, the state must limit
its tax to that portion of interstate income reasonably related to the
corporation's activity in the state.41 Vermont applied the unitary
business apportionment principle to determine the portion of income
related to the busihness conducted within the state. The Mobil Court
approved, noting "the linchpin of apportionability in the field of state
taxation is the unitary business principle. ' 42 Therefore, once a state
determines the taxpayer is engaged in a unitary business, the appor-
tionment formula provides a "reasonably related" tax base calcula-
tion consistent with the second due process requirement.43 In Exxon
Corp. v. Department of Revenue,44 Wisconsin had applied a three-
36. Id. The "nexus" requirement concerns the physical presence of a member of
the corporate group doing business in the state. The rational relationship standard in-
volves the amount of income attributed to the state instead of actual physical presence.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 439. See supra note 10.
39. Id. at 439.
40. Id. at 439-40.
Once the state determines the business was part of a unitary business, the "nexus"
requirement is established for the entire corporate group and not only the in-state
business.
41. See Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 404.
42. 445 U.S. at 439.
43. Once a unitary business is established, the Supreme Court has approved the
three-factor formula as a means of calculating the reasonably related tax base.
However, the "rational relationship" requirement may remain an obstacle to state in-
come taxation. If the apportioned tax liability is "out of all appropriate proportion to the
business transmitted by the appellant in that state," then the "rational relationship" re-
quirement is violated. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S.
123, 135 (1931).
Furthermore, if the taxpayer establishes the income was earned outside the scope of
the unitary business, then apportionment of worldwide income is not appropriate. 445
U.S. at 439. See Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 406 ("[o]nly in the absence of unitary
business does the Due Process Clause require the state to exclude from the payee's ap-
portionable tax base dividends received from the payor."). Mobil, however, failed to
prove that the foreign activities were part of a discrete enterprise, rather than a unitary
business. Therefore, the Court concluded that both due process requirements were satis-
fied. 445 U.S. at 439-40.
44. 447 U.S. 207 (1980). Unlike Mobil, the challenge did not involve taxation of
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factor apportionment formula to Exxon's entire income. Exxon ob-
jected to this three-factor formula because Exxon had performed
only marketing activities in Wisconsin. Exxon utilized separate func-
tional accounting, thereby separating its Wisconsin income from its
other activities. Because Exxon conducted all nonmarketing activities
outside Wisconsin, Exxon argued no established nexus existed be-
tween the income from those activities and Wisconsin. 5 The Court
rejected the argument, holding that a "nexus" would be lacking only
where the out-of-state income was derived from an "unregulated
business activity" which constitutes a "discrete business enterprise"
such that the business in an out of the taxing state are not function-
ally integrated.4
The Court also found that separate functional accounting failed to
defeat the "rational relationship" requirement. This relationship ex-
isted even though Exxon's accounting demonstrated that the Wiscon-
sin operation had failed to show a net profit for the years in ques-
tion.47 Holding that Exxon's internal accounting system was not
binding on the state for tax purposes, 48 the Court relied upon Wis-
consin's three-factor apportionment formula to demonstrate the "ra-
tional relationship" existed between the tax base attributed to the
State and the intrastate value of the business." Again, as in Mobil,
the corporation's failure to prove it was not engaged in unitary busi-
ness precipitated failure of its due process arguments.
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho
State Tax Commission"0 and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and
Revenue Department.51 The two cases involved dividends and gains
from foreign subsidiaries that were included in the domestic parent's
tax base because the state taxing authorities concluded the compa-
foreign-source dividend income.
45. Id. at 220.
46. Id. at 223-24. The Court concluded that Exxon's use of separate functional
accounting did not sufficiently establish that its functional departments were discrete
enterprises.
47. Id. at 227.
48. Id. at 226.
49. Id. at 226-27.
50. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
51. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
Both ASARCO and Woolworth denied they were engaged in unitary business with
their subsidiaries. The due process requirements, they asserted, were not fulfilled because
the businesses were not unitary, and this taxation violated the "nexus" and "rational
relationship" standards. As a result of the arguments, both opinions relied heavily on the
facts, and have been criticized by some commentators.
nies were engaged in unitary business. 52
Although the decisions were greatly limited to the facts presented,
ASARCO and Woolworth have some precedental value concerning
the burden of proof for the due process arguments. The corporations
in ASARCO and Woolworth succeeded in establishing that the for-
eign members of the corporate group were engaged in discrete busi-
ness enterprises. 3 Proving the entire income apportioned was not
earned as part of a unitary business activity, the corporations suc-
cessfully proved the tax had been unconstitutionally applied.54 The
implication after ASARCO and Woolworth is that those challenging
unitary taxation might receive a de novo adjudication by challenging
the trial court's classification of unitary business. 55
In Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board56 the Court limited its
role in applying the "unitary business" standards, and refined the
due process requirements enunciated in Mobil.
In Container, the plaintiff, a Delaware corporation headquartered
in Illinois, operated through subsidiaries in California and overseas.
Container disputed the state court's determination that it was en-
gaged in a unitary business with its subsidiaries; Container asked the
Supreme Court to reexamine the facts and make its own determina-
tion. The Court refused, explaining its position on review of state
court judgments. 58 The Court commented, in a footnote, that in both
ASARCO and Woolworth it had also relied on findings made by the
52. See Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 415-20. See also Greene, ASARCO and
Woolworth, Anomalous Anachronisms with Limited Precedental Value, 18 TAx NOTES
795 (1983). Mr. Greene has called the pair "two deviant cases" and suggests their appli-
cability is limited because of the heavy reliance on the facts. He asserts the two cases fit
into an exception created in Mobil because of their unique facts and are of limited prece-
dental value. Mr. Greene asserts their only value is affirmation of the principle that the
taxpayer carries the burden of proof with regard to "unitary business." Further, Mr.
Greene declares the cases are analytically defective because they fail to enunciate a due
process rationale that can be applied to those situations where income from stock invest-
ments should constitutionally be includable in the taxpayer's apportionable tax base.
53. 458 U.S. 307. The Supreme Court reached its conclusion despite the state
court's factual documentation and contrary conclusion regarding the unitary nature of
the businesses. The Court found fault in the standards applied by the lower court.
54. Id.
55. Further, the Court's extensive documentation of findings may provide some
standards in future litigation pertaining to the unitary nature of a business.
56. 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983).
57. Id. at 4991-92.
58. The factual records in such cases, even when the parties enter into a stipu-
lation, tend to be long and complex, and the line between "historical fact" and
"constitutional fact" is often fuzzy at best. It will do the cause of legal certainty
little good if this Court turns every colorable claim that a state court erred in a
particular application of those principles into a de novo adjudication whose un-
intended nuances would then spawn further litigation and an avalanche of criti-
cal comment. Rather, our task must be to determine whether the state court
applied the correct standards to the case; and if it did, whether its judgment was
within the realm of permissible judgment. Id. at 4992 (citations omitted).
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state courts.59 Therefore, it now seems unlikely that the Court will
overturn state court findings of unitary business.
Container also argued the three-factor apportionment formula was
inaccurate and unfair as applied to multinational corporations be-
cause of salient differences among national economies.60 It contended
that such inaccuracy violated the Due Process Clause rational rela-
tionship requirement. The Court responded that after a state has de-
termined that the corporate activities are a unitary business, due
process requires the taxing authority to apply a "fair"61 apportion-
ment formula. Fairness is determined by a two-part test:
The first, and again obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment
formula is what might be called internal consistency - that is the formula
must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no
more than all of the unitary business's income being taxed. The second and
more difficult requirement is what might be called external consistency -
the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually re-
flect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.
62
The Court has accepted the three-factor test suggested by the Uni-
form Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 3 as satisfying the
59. Id. at 4992 n.15. This seeming inconsistency (see supra note 53) may have
resulted from the Court's interpretation of the standards applied in ASARCO rather
than its desire to avoid ASARCO-type review. Only future cases will reveal the extent of
scrutiny in which the Court is willing to engage.
60. Id. at 4988.
Varying rates of return in different countries are not reflected by the formulas. How-
ever, this distorts the values and attributes more income to the state than actually earned
there.
For example, if salary of lOX is paid in the California subsidiary to staff 10 employ-
ees, in another country 10K spent on salary by a related corporation might employ 40.
The foreign partner will be earning at a higher rate of return on each salary dollar spent
since his capacity for production will be greater. However, applying the apportionment
does not reflect this and because the California operation had one-half the salary ex-
pense, a larger portion of the income will be attributed to California even though the
foreign operation may operate at a net profit (because of the higher return) while the
California operation ends up with a net loss. Therefore, if a California subsidiary has $0
in before-tax income, and because of much higher expenses for property and salary has
one-half the group's payroll and property and one-fifth of the sales, it will be taxed on
40% of worldwide income despite the much higher rate of return elsewhere. See infra
notes 199 & 217. The formula apportions income to California that was not earned there
and may even result in taxation where there is no net income.
61. The two due process requirements developed in Mobil and Exxon pertained to
the general exercise of state taxation of interstate commerce. The test in Container ap-
plies to the formula only.
62. 51 U.S.L.W. 4987, 4940. This test applies to the formula(s) employed by the
states to apportion the income of the unitary corporate group, whereas the Mobil due
process requirements applied to the taxation of interstate commerce in general.
63. See supra note 9.
Container requirements."
In summary recent cases involving state taxation of domestic par-
ent corporations have established two due process requirements that
must be satisfied by any state tax on interstate commerce. First, a
"minimal connection" must exist between the income and the taxing
state. Second, there must be a "rational relationship" between the
extent of tax liability and the intrastate business activities.
To prove a violation of either of these due process requirements,
the domestic-based corporation must show the income was earned by
a "discrete business enterprise" rather than by unitary business. Al-
though the Court has engaged in extensive judicial review of the
state courts' "unitary business" determination, the Container opinion
indicates it may decline such analysis in the future.
Additionally, when a state apportions the income of a unitary bus-
iness, its formula must be "fair" as judged by the tests provided in
Container."5
Commerce Clause Considerations
Challenges to unitary taxation raised by domestic-based multina-
tional corporations have also been founded on the "negative implica-
tions" of the Commerce Clause."8 This Clause prohibits state imposi-
tion of undue burden on interstate or foreign commerce.
In Mobil,67 the domestic corporation argued that the unitary tax
method subjected interstate commerce to duplicative taxation. Mobil
asserted that a possibility of double taxation of dividend income ex-
isted because the state of incorporation could tax the dividends in
full in addition to Vermont's tax based also on the apportioned divi-
dend income.68 Mobil further asserted that wholly intrastate corpo-
rate taxpayers would not be subject to these duplicative tax
possibilities.69
64. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4990.
65. Id.
66. In ASARCO and Woolworth, however, the Court decided the cases without
consideration of the Commerce Clause requirement because the due process standards
were violated. This portion of the Comment, therefore, analyzes the tests developed and
applied in Mobil, Exxon, and Container.
The Commerce Clause prohibits the states from placing an undue burden upon inter-
state or foreign commerce. The challenges were based on the unitary tax and its effects
that unduly burdened those participating in interstate and foreign commerce.
See Hellerstein, State Tax Discrimination Against Out-of-State, 30 NAT'L TAX J.
113, 117 (1977) ("Although the Commerce Clause is framed as a grant to Congress of
the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, it has long been interpreted as
restricting state taxing powers despite the silence of Congress . . . the Commerce
Clause, by its own force, prohibits states from imposing 'undue burdens' on interstate
commerce.").
67. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
68. Id. at 443.
69. Id.
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In reply, the Court applied the four-year test first suggested in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.70 Under the test, the Court
must examine the practical effect of the challenged tax to determine
whether it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against in-
terstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by
the State.171 In response to Mobil's allegations of potential discrimi-
nation, the Court concluded that Mobil had offered no proof of ac-
tual multiple taxation.72 Additionally, the Court refused to declare a
constitutional preference for specific allocation tax methods over uni-
tary apportionment.7 3 Mobil failed to demonstrate interstate com-
merce violations, and the Court refused to condemn unitary taxation
on the theoretical possibility of multiple taxation.
Exxon also founded its interstate commerce objections upon poten-
tial multiple taxation."' Again applying the Complete Auto test, the
Court concluded that no instance of actual multiple tax had been
shown;7 5 therefore, there was no discrimination. The Court further
stated that the Commerce Clause did not prevent a state from ap-
portioning worldwide income that the corporations had separated
from its in-state operations through its own departmental accounting
methods.7 6 Therefore, Exxon failed to show either actual double tax-
ation or an unfair relationship to the services provided by the taxing
state because the unitary apportionment formula provided the "rea-
sonable" relationship.
In addition to interstate commerce challenges, Mobil attacked the
tax under the foreign commerce element of the Commerce Clause.
The domestic-based corporation relied on the rationale developed in
Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles."' In Japan Line, six Jap-
anese shipping companies had transported cargo exclusively in for-
eign commerce. Each ship used Japan as its home port and site of
registration. Each ship carried cargo containers which Japan taxed
in full value.7 9 While the containers were in Los Angeles County, the
70. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
71. 445 U.S. at 443, (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
279 (1977)).
72. Id. at 444.
73. Id. at 444-46.
74. Exxon Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 229-30.
77. Id.
78. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
79. Id. at 436.
county leveled an ad valorem property tax on them.80
The Japanese shipping companies protested the assessments under
the Commerce Clause standards incorporated in the Complete Auto
test. The Court concluded these limited standards were too narrowly
focused to evaluate the constitutionality of state taxes on foreign
commerce."' The Court determined that two additional factors, be-
yond those of Complete Auto, must be considered in such situa-
tions.8 2 First, the Court must consider the enhanced risk of multiple
taxation. 3 The second consideration is whether state taxation on in-
strumentalities of foreign commerce might impair essential federal
uniformity.84
Japan Line determined that even a slight overlap of tax, deemed
de minimis in a domestic context, assumes greater importance in the
foreign commerce context. 85 Therefore, state or local taxation of for-
eign commerce dictates a stricter inquiry due to limits in Supreme
Court jurisdiction, the likelihood of multiple taxation, and the dras-
tic effects resulting from state interference with national trade
policy. 88
The Court recognized three areas where state policy may interfere
with uniform federal policy concerning tax on foreign commerce.
First, there might be international disputes over reconciling appor-
tionment formulae.87 Second, such taxation may result in retaliation
against United States owners of foreign subsidiaries. 88 Third, various
instrumentalities of foreign commerce might be subject to varying
degrees of multiple taxation among the states, thereby preventing
the nation from "speaking with one voice."8' 9
The Court rejected Mobil's reliance upon Japan Line because it
was a domestic-based corporation;90 the issue in Mobil was domestic
80. Id. at 437-38.
81. Id. at 445-46 ("the premise ... that the Commerce Clause analysis is identi-
cal, regardless of whether interstate foreign commerce is involved .... must be
rejected".).
82. Id. at 445-46.
83. Id. at 446.
When interstate commerce alone is involved the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
all taxing authorities and can guarantee that no multiple taxation be involved. However,
when the states employing the unitary method conflict with foreign governments employ-
ing the internationally accepted arms-length method, the Supreme Court cannot correct
the multiple taxation because it has no jurisdiction over the foreign taxing authority. As
a result, uncorrected multiple taxation may occur.
84. Id. at 448.
States cannot have independent foreign policies which prevent the federal government
from "speaking with one voice" in the area of foreign policy.
85. Id. at 456.
86. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 386-89.
87. 441 U.S. at 450.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 450-51.
90. 445 U.S. at 446-48.
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multiple taxation, not taxation by foreign and domestic authorities.9 1
The key factor was that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over
both taxing authorities in Mobil, although the source of the income
was foreign. 2
Therefore, prior to Container, the Court applied the Complete
Auto test to domestic-based parents,93 and the stricter Japan Line
standards only when the same income or instrumentalities were
taxed by state and foreign taxing authorities. 4
Container Corporation also raised Commerce Clause objections to
unitary taxation. The Court conceded that the possibility of interna-
tional double taxation required a stricter inquiry into Commerce
Clause objections. 5 However, the policies supporting the application
of the Japan Line standards did not apply to Container, a domestic-
based corporation.""
Initially, the Court analyzed the similarities between Container
and Japan Line, including "actual double taxation" on the parent
corporation's income resulting from serious divergence in the taxing
schemes adopted by the state and foreign tax jurisdictions.9 7 Second,
the method employed by the foreign taxing authority was consistent
with internationally accepted practice.9 8 Third, federal policy pre-
ferred arms-length apportionment to the unitary business method.99
The Court, however, distinguished the cases. First, Japan Line in-
volved a property tax whereas Container involved an income tax.100
Further distinguishing Japan Line, the Court found that the double
taxation, although actually occurring in this case, was not the inevi-
91. Id. at 447.
92. Id.
However, if the other taxing authority had been foreign, the jurisdictional defect could
not have been cured.
93. Unlike Mobil, in Exxon the Court did not engage in analysis of the applicabil-
ity of Japan Line. The parent was again domestic-based and the Supreme Court had
jurisdiction over the taxing authorities. As a result, the Court relied only on the Com-
plete Auto test for the same reasons given in Mobil.
94. See generally, Rudy, supra note 17.
95. *Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987, 4990 (U.S. June
27, 1983).
96. Id. at 4995-97.
97. Id. at 4994-95.
98. Id. at 4995.
99. Id.
100. Id. As commentators have suggested, this distinction is rather tenuous be-
cause the unitary tax concept was originally developed as a property tax device. See
Rudy, supra note 17, at 391. Additionally, the Court had relied heavily on property tax
concepts sustaining the constitutionality of the tax. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4995.
table result of the California taxing scheme. 10 1
The Supreme Court emphasized that the tax in Container fell not
on a foreign business or instrumentality of foreign commerce, but on
a corporation domiciled and headquartered in the United States.10 2
The decision explicitly excluded unitary taxation of companies with
foreign parents. 03 The Court had once again illustrated the distinc-
tion in the tests to be applied to domestic-based parents and to for-
eign-based parents.10 4
In summary, analysis of recent Commerce Clause challenges ad-
vanced by domestic-based corporations reveals two essential points.
First, if the challenge to the unitary tax method is made by a domes-
tic-based corporation, the Supreme Court will apply the four-part
Complete Auto test. Second, the Supreme Court has refused to ap-
prove specifically the constitutionality of application of the unitary
tax principle to corporations with foreign-based parents. However,
the treatment in Container indicates that the policies outlined in Ja-
pan Line apply to such corporations and the Court may apply the
stricter Japan Line standards. 10 5 The focus now turns to judicial
treatment of challenges by foreign-based corporations in light of the
appropriate Commerce Clause criteria to be applied.
PART II: LITIGATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS BY
FOREIGN PARENTS OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Foreign parent corporations of subsidiaries subject to unitary taxa-
tion have two alternative means to assert their constitutional objec-
tions: (1) litigation; or (2) indirect challenge by successful lobbying
efforts encouraging Congress to enact uniform limitations on unitary
taxation. 06 The discussion considers the probability of success in a
constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court. Additionally, the





104. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 390-91. Mr. Rudy analyzes the distinctions be-
tween the two Commerce Clause tests and the proper fact situations for applications of
each.
105. The Container Court, nevertheless, applied the policies supporting the Japan
Line principles to the facts in the Container case, concluding that when the situation
involved a domestic parent corporation, the application of the stricter Japan Line stan-
dards is not justified. The value of Container, for the purpose of this inquiry, is that it
analyzes the policies supporting the application of the stricter Japan Line standards. This
enables one to anticipate the treatment of a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge by a
foreign-based corporation.
106. See P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
677-704 (1981). See Part III, infra for a discussion of the second alternative.
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Likelihood of Success in Litigation of Foreign Corporations'
Commerce Clause Objections
As Part I illustrated, the Supreme Court employs a more search-
ing Commerce Clause inquiry into the constitutionality of state taxa-
tion when the international multiple taxation is a possibility.107 The
Court has applied the four-part Complete Auto test to the constitu-
tional challenges advanced by domestic-based parents. 10 8 However,
the stricter Japan Line standards' 9 will be applied to taxation of
instrumentalities of foreign commerce when the underlying policies
support application in the specific case. 1 0 This portion of the Com-
ment analyzes those policies expressed in Japan Line and interpreted
in Container to predict the Supreme Court's treatment of a Com-
merce Clause challenge brought by a foreign-based corporation.1
In Japan Line, the Court required a trial court to investigate
whether the challenged state tax creates a substantial risk of interna-
tional multiple taxation," and whether the state tax prevents the
federal government from "speaking with one voice" in the regulation
of foreign trade." 3 Violation of either of these precepts renders the
state tax unconstitutional."4
Four principles are relevant to demonstrating violations of the Ja-
pan Line precepts. First is the existence of actual international mul-
tiple taxation.'1 5 Second, the Court suggested that reconciling of dif-
ferent apportionment formulae may create serious international
administrative burdens."6 Third, whether foreign nations whose
companies were disadvantaged by the state tax might retaliate
107. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987, 4990 (U.S. June
27, 1983). This portion of the Comment will analyze only the Commerce Clause objec-
tions that can be claimed by all foreign parents with domestic subsidiaries subject to
unitary apportionment. The due process objections depend largely on factual proof that
the income was earned outside the scope of a unitary business. The Commerce Clause
objection, conversely, is common to all foreign-based corporations.
108. E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
109. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
110. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4995-97.
111. Recall, that the Container Court expressly refused to extend its holding to the
situation of corporations with foreign parents. Id. at 4995 n.26.
112. 441 U.S. at 451.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 447-48.
The Court declared that "even a slight overlapping of tax - a problem that might be
deemed de minimis in a domestic contest - assumes importance when sensitive matters
of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned." Id. at 456.
116. Id. at 450.
against American-owned instrumentalities present in foreign juris-
dictions.117 Fourth, the state tax may become an international irri-
tant in the realm of governmental foreign trade policy."'
Unitary taxation of subsidiaries of foreign-based corporations
breaches each of the Japan Line precepts. First, the unitary tax sys-
tem inherently causes multiple taxation of the same income when
applied on the international level.1 19 The foreign parent's worldwide
income is taxed in its home country. That same worldwide income is
then used as a basis for state apportionment to determine its taxable
share of income.1 20 The arms-length method is the internationally
preferred method primarily because it avoids the extensive multiple
taxation present in the unitary method. 21
Compliance with both state unitary taxation and a foreign govern-
ment's own separate accounting principles places a significant ad-
ministrative burden upon foreign parents that is not equally borne by
domestic-based parents.122 Furthermore, the parent may be pre-
cluded by foreign secrecy laws from releasing some information de-
manded by the states in computing the apportionment.' 23
Additionally, state use of unitary taxation precipitates retaliation
from trading partners by raising taxes on U.S. companies. 24 In addi-
tion to tax increases against domestic-based companies, foreign par-
ent corporations are locating subsidiaries in states that do not em-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 450-51.
119. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 387. Mr. Rudy asserts that the resultant multiple
taxation alone is enough basis to justify a finding of unconstitutionality as applied to
foreign-based parent corporations.
For tax purposes in the parent corporation's home country, the parent will conform to
that country's accepted accounting principles and currency. However, the unitary tax
method requires that the parent correct all values to United States currency and conform
to the United States accepted accounting principles. Additionally, nonuniformity among
the states magnifies the burden for those corporations operating in more than one unitary
taxation state. House Hearings, supra note 15, at 182 (statement of James W.
McCrath).
120. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987, 4994 (U.S.
June 27, 1983).
121. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 360 (letter from Paola Pansa
Cedronio). See also Note, supra note 16, at 356-58. If all jurisdictions use the arms-
length method without readjustment then there will not be multiple tax on the same
income. But, if the home country uses the arms-length method, that same income that
was taxed in the home country might, as a result of the apportionment formula, be at-
"tributed to the state and also taxed by the state. Therefore, use of unitary taxation leads
to multiple taxation. The arms-length method, however, may also produce multiple taxa-
tion in those situations where the taxing authority readjusts the returns attributing more
income to the jurisdiction than corporate accounting revealed. However, this multiple
taxation is not an inherent function of the system such as it is with unitary taxation.
122. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 91 (California guidelines for the prep-
aration of combined returns).
123. Id. at 226 (statement of D.E. Hammond).
124. Id. at 137-38 (statement of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr).
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ploy unitary apportionment.2 5 Some states have lost considerable
tax revenues because of their employment of the unitary tax
method.126
Finally, the unitary apportionment method employed by the states
has interfered with federal foreign trade policy.' 27 The ratification
problems associated with the United States-United Kingdom Tax
Treaty illustrate the grave effects state unitary taxation can have for
foreign trade.128
Therefore, state unitary taxation of subsidiaries of foreign corpo-
rations violates the concerns voiced in Japan Line. Assuming the
Court would apply the Japan Line standards to challenges by these
subsidiaries, the Court would probably declare this application of
unitary taxation unconstitutional.
The Court's reasoning in refusing to apply the Japan Line stan-
dards to the domestic corporation in Container indicates that those
stricter standards would be applied in constitutional challenges pur-
sued by foreign parent corporation subsidiaries subject to unitary
taxation.129
Concluding that Japan Line did not absolutely prohibit double
taxation, the Container Court also considered fairness to the state of
requiring the state to shift to alternatives to unitary taxation. 30 The
Container Court reasoned that because the possibility of multiple
taxation existed with the arms-length method,' the unitary method
125. Id. at 141-44. See L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1984, at 3, col. 6 & at 28, col. 1.
Japanese companies have decided to halt all growth in California and other states that
employ the unitary tax concept.
126. However, the unitary tax method results in revenues that are much larger
than generated with a separate accounting. The theory of many states may be that reve-
nue loss from discouragement of foreign investment (see infra note 224) is more than
offset by employment of the unitary tax principle. Florida is considering repeal of its
unitary tax statute because of the disincentive to foreign investment. Advocates of repeal
argue that income generated by the tax does not outweigh the loss due to relocation of
foreign investment. DAILY TAx REPORTER (BNA), No. 32, G-12 & No. 55, G-9 (1984).
127. See Note, supra note 16, at 359-60.
128. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 138 (statement of Senator Charles
McC. Mathias, Jr.). See also Comment, supra note 2, at 499.
The treaty was not ratified for a long period because of negotiations over a provision
for the elimination of state unitary taxation. The United Kingdom adopted the treaty
only because the Carter Administration promised to provide pre-emptive federal legisla-
tion limiting the states. DAILY TAx REPORTER (BNA), No. 242, G-7, G-8 (1983).
129. The Container court realized that the reason it gave for distinguishing Japan
Line might not apply to an analysis involving foreign parent corporations. 51 U.S.L.W.
at 4997 n.32.
130. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4995.
131. See supra note 121.
should not be struck down merely to avoid multiple taxation.8 2
However, the Court asserted that it had justifiably invalidated the
taxing practice in Japan Line because the method violated interna-
tional practice and express federal policy.133 State unitary taxation
on the international level also violates international practice and is'
inconsistent with the federal policy in employing the arms-length
method. Therefore, state unitary taxation of foreign-based corpora-
tions is similar in effect to the tax involved in Japan Line, and could
justifiably be invalidated for many of the same reasons given in Ja-
pan Line.
Assuming, arguendo, that international multiple taxation alone
does not condemn the unitary method, the other policies suggested in
Container justify holding the tax unconstitutional. If a state "either
implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the federal gov-
ernment or violates a clear federal doctrine," the Court concluded,
the state tax would then violate the Japan Line "one voice" require-
ment. 1 34 First, the Court considered the possibility that irritated for-
eign trading partners might retaliate against domestic-based corpo-
ration.13 5 The Court then relied on its own objective standards
created to "reflect very general observations about the imperatives of
international trade and international relations." 6 The Court con-
cluded that the tax against the domestic parent did not automati-
cally create an "asymmetry in international taxations 37 However,
when the unitary tax is applied to the income of foreign parents,
such an automatic "asymmetry" exists in the violation of interna-
tionally accepted practice.13 8
Further, the Court believed that a foreign government might be no
more concerned by the method of allocation than by an increase in a
state's tax rates. 139 The pivotal role played by the unitary tax provi-
sion in the United States-United Kingdom Tax Treaty,1 40 and the
protests leveled by the Common Market countries,1 41 however, indi-
cate foreign governments are much more concerned with limiting the
use of unitary taxation than with limiting prevailing state tax rates.
132. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4995-96.
133. Id. at 4995.
134. Additionally, the Court distinguished Japan Line because Container involved
a domestic corporation. Clearly, this distinction would not apply to challenges brought by
subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Id. at 4997 n.32.
135. Id. at 4996.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. The asymmetry exists because the unitary tax states employ a method that i§
not employed by the overwhelming majority of major trading nations.
139. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4997.
140. See supra note 128.
141. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 36 (letter from Paola Pansa
Cedronio).
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The Container Court assumed no federal opposition to the Califor-
nia unitary tax because the federal government had failed to file an
amicus curiae brief.14 2 The Executive Branch however, had not ac-
quiesced in Container. Initially, President Reagan asked the Court
to reconsider its decision. Recently, the President announced he had
formed a task force to deal with the problems caused by state uni-
tary taxation.
In summary, the distinguishing rationale employed in Container
indicates the Supreme Court should apply the Japan Line standards
in a constitutional challenge pursued by a subsidiary of a foreign
corporation. Furthermore, state unitary taxation should be found un-
constitutional under the Japan Line standards.
Problems Encountered in Litigating a Constitutional Challenge
The foreign parent seeking to litigate its constitutional claims im-
mediately encounters problems in selecting the desired judicial fo-
rum. Although corporations normally prefer to litigate constitutional
challenges in the federal courts,14 4 the Injunction Act' 4 5 may bar
corporations from challenging the tax in a federal forum. Instead,
the corporation must bring its challenge in the state courts, which
may be reluctant to invalidate taxes which provide their states with
large revenues. 46 Thus, the taxpayer is usually denied a federal fo-
rum until all state judicial remedies have been exhausted, and then
only if the Supreme Court agrees to hear the case.1 47
If barred from federal courts, foreign parents may be denied any
judicial forum in many states. The reason is that many states, in-
cluding California, provide state court remedies only after the tax-
payer actually pays the tax.148 Because the subsidiaries, not the par-
ents, are responsible for tax payment, the parent has no state court
remedy either.
Recently, the federal courts have faced the difficult issues sur-
rounding the interplay between the Injunction Act and state refund
142. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4997.
143. See DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 186, G-3 (1983).
144. Elliot & Lauber, Ninth Circuit's New EMI Decision May Have Wide Impact
on Corporation's State Taxes, 57 J. TAX'N 94 (1982).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, sus-
pend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law, where a
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
146. See Elliot & Lauber, supra note 144, at 94.
147. Id.
148. E.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 26102 (West 1979).
statutes.149  Capitol-EMP150  involved companion cases brought
against the members of the Franchise Tax Board as individuals to
prevent them from assessing further taxes upon the California sub-
sidiary. EMI, Inc., the United Kingdom parent corporation, engaged
in the same recording business as its subsidiary, Capitol, but prima-
rily in markets other than the United States.151 The district judge
dismissed the complaint concluding that the California refund
scheme provided a "plain, speedy, and efficient" remedy within the
ambit of the Injunction Act.1 52 Both corporations appealed.
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the California refund action pro-
vided Capitol a sufficient remedy, despite exhaustive administrative
prerequisites.15 3 Therefore, the Injunction Act barred the subsidi-
ary's federal action, limiting the subsidiary to challenging the uni-
tary tax in the state court. However, in assessing EMI's contention
that it had no adequate state court remedy, the court recognized that
the California refund action was only available for the actual tax-
payers. 5 The Ninth Circuit concluded that EMI's interests, al-
though similar to Capitol's, were not identical. 55 Thus, EMI was
denied a state court remedy,1 56 and the Injunction Act did not bar
its federal action. The court concluded that "[a] nontaxpayer that
has stated a claim with respect to an assessment or collection is enti-
tled to a judicial remedy in which they can participate as a
party."1 57 However, the court qualified EMI's victory by remanding
the case to the district court to determine whether EMI had standing
to sue.158
149. See Elliot & Lauber, supra note 144, at 94-96.
150. Capitol Industries - EMI, Inc. v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 570 (1982). Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. FTB, 539 F. Supp. 512
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) followed the EMI case.
151. 681 F.2d at 1112.
152. Id. at 1115.
153. Id. at 1118.
154. Id.
155. Id. The district judge had concluded that EMI's interests were identical to
Capitol's and, therefore, EMI had in effect "a plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy."
156. Id. at 1119.
157. Id. n.31. Defendants also raised eleventh amendment defenses. The court re-jected this bar to EMI's action concluding that a suit for declarative or injunctive relief
against a state official in federal court was not barred by the eleventh amendment where
it was alleged that the officer was performing pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.
158. Id. at 1119 n.31. Considering the applicability of the Injunction Act to ac-
tions brought by foreign parents, the court in Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. FTB followed the
Ninth Circuit's lead. The court considered the policy behind the enactment of the In-junction Act, namely, that foreign parents should not be given an advantage over domes-
tic corporations by granting them access to federal courts to challenge state taxes (ad-
vantage of forum shopping). Nonetheless, the court concluded that as a result of the
different parent and subsidiary interests, the Injunction Act should not bar the parent's
action. Additionally, the court expressed reservations over the standing of the parent,
similar to those expressed in Capitol-EML Therefore, the court stayed the action pend-
ing resolution of the standing and other issues in the EMI action on remand. 539 F.
898
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On remand, the district judge concluded EMI lacked the requisite
standing 159 because EMI had suffered no injury. Although the as-
sessment was made against Capitol, EMI arguably suffered injury
because, as the majority shareholder, the value of its investment
would decrease if Capitol must pay the challenged tax. 60 "Although
an injury to a corporation may indirectly harm a shareholder by de-
creasing the value of his shares, that fact does not give the share-
holder standing to sue on his own behalf."' 61 Therefore, EMI's
shareholder status failed to provide standing absent proof the share-
holder suffered from a breach of a separate duty owed to him. 6 2
The court also rejected EMI's argument that it enjoyed standing
because the tax violated the United States-United Kingdom Income
Tax Convention. 6 3 The court reiterated that EMI did not pay the
tax and held that the treaty did not create a right of action in the
parent of a tax paying subsidiary.164
Other theories have been proposed as possible solutions to the
standing problem. Arguably, the subsidiary pays the tax as an
"agent" for the "principal" parent.6 5 Therefore, any injury to the
agent would be an injury to the principal, providing standing. An-
other possible argument relies on cases allowing standing for an or-
Supp. 512, 513-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
159. EMI Ltd. v. Bennett, 560 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ca. 1982).
160. Id. at 135.
161. Id. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). See generally 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531 (West
1975).
162. 560 F. Supp. at 135.
163. Id.
164. Id. Similarly, the Alcan court concluded the parent had no independent right
to sue. The court quoted the Supreme Court:
[T]he standing question in its Art. III aspect "is whether the plaintiff has 'al-
leged such a personal stake in the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of
federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial power on
his behalf". . . .[T]he relevant inquiry is whether . . . the plaintiff has shown
an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
558 F. Supp. 624, 626. In response to Alcan's argument that the tax was directly upon
the parent, the court reasoned that since California employed unitary apportionment, the
tax was proportionate only to the business done within the state and by definition could
not be upon the parent. Therefore, Alcan's claim that it had suffered a "distinct and
palpable injury" was invalid. Id. at 625-26.
Additionally, Alcan failed to establish standing because of its shareholder status. The
court concluded that mere fluctuations in the value of stock or size of dividend was not
enough to grant the shareholder an independent cause of action. The Supreme Court
refused to grant certiorari on these issues, 104 S. Ct. 705 (1984). See also, Shell Petro-
leum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 537 (1983).
165. See Elliot & Lauber, supra note 144, at 94-96.
ganization suing on behalf of a member.6 6 However no precedent
exists for such arguments and the policies reflected in EMI suggest
the argument would fail.16 7 Again, weighty countervailing policies,
such as federalism, are involved, and the subsidiary still has a state
court action. It is doubtful a court would accept that argument
either.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, standing principles will
likely preclude the foreign parent from the federal courts. Addition-
ally, in many states which provide refund actions only for the actual
taxpayer, the parent is also precluded from the state courts. Like-
wise, the subsidiary is barred from the federal courts by the Injunc-
tion Act. Therefore, foreign parent corporations can only pursue
their constitutional objections to the state tax through a state court
action brought by the subsidiaries.
Although these corporations would likely succeed in litigation
before the Supreme Court,1 68 disadvantages exist. The first disadvan-
tage to litigation is the time factor. As previously discussed, the state
administrative procedures are extensive and must be exhausted
before reaching the state trial courts. 69 The action may be litigated
for several years before reaching the Supreme Court. 10 Another dis-
advantage is expense. The costs of such long-term litigation from in-
ception of the action in the state administrative procedures until the
judicial resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court would be
staggering.
Primary among the disadvantages is the lack of uniformity in a
case-by-case evaluation of the state statutes.1 71 Because each state
has different taxing statutes, any adjudication of constitutionality
will apply only to the statute before the court. Therefore, if the end
to be achieved is uniform limitation of state unitary taxation, litiga-
tion of constitutional challenges is not a desirable alternative. In
light of the Supreme Court deferment to Congress,172 the passage of
uniform legislation limiting state uniform taxation must be
166. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 161, § 3531, at
196-211; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
167. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 161, § 3531.
168. See Rudy, supra note 17; DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 183, G-1
(1982) (statement of Richard DeLap).
169. See General Accounting Office (GAO), Key Issues Affecting State Taxation
of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Need Resolving, 16 TAX NOTES 159 (1982).
170. See DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 183, G-I & No. 234, G-5 (1982).
Also, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court will review the case after the admin-
istrative remedies have been exhausted.
171. GAO, supra note 169, at 161. See also DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No.
233, G-5 (1983).
172. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978) ("It is to that body
[Congress], and not this Court, that the Constitution has committed such policy deci-
sions."). In light of the Supreme Court's refusal to grant standing in the Shell case (see
supra note 164), foreign parents are forced to choose the legislative alternative.
900
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considered.
PART III: PASSAGE OF NATIONAL UNIFORM LEGISLATION
A favorable alternative to litigation might be a preemptive federal
law which would prohibit state unitary taxation of corporations with
foreign parents.17 3 However, the constitutionality of congressional
action limiting state taxing power is questionable in light of National
League of Cities v. Usery.174 Moreover, despite the presence of poli-
cies supporting such a proposal, the states and some commentators
have suggested many countervailing policies. 175 This portion of the
Comment analyzes two issues: first, whether a federal preemptive
statute limiting state unitary taxation of foreign-based corporations
would be a constitutional exercise under the Commerce Clause and
second, whether, in light of the competing policy arguments ad-
vanced, Congress should adopt such a proposal.
The Impact of National League of Cities v. Usery On the
Constitutionality of Congressional Control Over State Taxation
The constitutionality of any federal regulation limiting state taxa-
tion has fostered considerable speculation. In National League of
Cities, Justice Rehnquist17 6 determined that Congress's power to
regulate commerce was not unlimited when Congress chooses to reg-
ulate the States as States.'" Justice Rehnquist found that Congress
had limited constitutional power to regulate the states' freedom of
choice in areas of "integral governmental functions."' 7 8 As a result,
congressional governmental extension of minimum wage and maxi-
173. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 393. In terms of cost, lobbying and support of
congressional action are much more efficient than litigation. As mentioned previously, the
cost of the administrative burdens and state court remedies is staggering. The Federal
Income Tax deduction for lobbying expenses (26 U.S.C. § 162(e) (1978)) acts as an
added incentive for such corporations to engage in lobbying.
Another possible alternative is to lobby the individual states for a voluntary repeal of
their unitary tax statutes. This alternative is being exercised (see DAILY TAX REPORTER
(BNA), No. 40, G-4 (1984)), but it is unlikely that many states will abandon the method
without pressure from Congress or the Executive Branch.
174. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
175. See generally Parnell, Constitutional Considerations of Federal Control Over
the Sovereign Taxing Authority of the States, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 227 (1979).
176. There was no majority opinion in Usery. Justice Rehnquist wrote for four
members of the Court. Justice Blackmun concurred with the express understanding that
the Rehnquist opinion adopted his balancing approach. The dissenters filed two separate
opinions.
177. 426 U.S. at 855.
178. Id. at 852.
mum hours laws to state government employees was
unconstitutional.
No case has yet decided whether the state taxation structure is a
"traditional governmental function."1' 7 9 Commentators, however,
have suggested the state taxing power should qualify as a "tradi-
tional governmental function."' 80 If so, the Rehnquist approach
would prohibit a congressional limitation of state taxing power. This
protection has not materialized, however, because the Court will ap-
ply Justice Blackmun's "balancing approach"'' when considering
possible congressional acts favoring uniform state taxation mea-
sures. 182 In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair,""' the Supreme Court up-
held the single factor apportionment formula employed by Iowa. The
Court noted, however, that the states' freedom to formulate indepen-
dent policy in the area of unitary taxation is not unlimited:
[State independence] may have to yield to an overriding national interest in
uniformity, [and] the content of any uniform rules to which they must sub-
scribe should be determined only after due consideration is given to the
interests of all affected States. It is clear that the legislative power granted
to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply jus-
tify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform
rules for the division of income.8
This dicta indicates the Court will employ a "balancing approach"
in considering the constitutionality of federal regulation of state tax-
ation.""5 This also implies the Court would support congressional es-
tablishment of uniform rules for income division."' Previously, the
Court directed future corporate plaintiffs to the congressional forums
stating "[I]t is to [that] body, and not this Court, that the Constitu-
tion has committed such policy decisions."' 8 7
179. See Parnell, supra note 175, at 238.
180. Id. Hartman, in his work on federal limitations on state taxing powers, com-
mented that "[T]here is sufficient elasticity and indefiniteness in the Rehnquist rhetoric
to warrant the conclusion that the present tax structure of the state and local govern-
ments are 'traditional ways in which the local governments have arranged their affairs,'
so as to be shielded from congressional regulation." P. HARTMAN, supra note 106, at 687.
181. See supra note 176.
182. See Parnell, supra note 175, at 239-41.
183. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
184. Id. at 280.
185. See Parnell, supra note 175, at 240.
186. This conclusion can be drawn by weighing the state's interests against the
national interests as expfessed in Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434 (1979). The national interest in free foreign trade, speaking with one voice, and
preventing retaliation, would support the constitutionality of the congressional action
also.
187. 437 U.S. at 280. Thus, it has been suggested that "the optimal congressional
solution must strike that delicate balance between the sovereignty of the states to struc-
ture their tax laws to prbvide themselves with adequate revenues and the desirability of
the minimum amount of interference on the national economy." Parnell, supra note 175,
at 252. The Court has suggested it would uphold enactment of uniform rules which fol-
lowed such careful consideration by Congress. 437 U.S. at 280.
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Policies Opposing Congressional Enactment of Limitations on
Unitary Apportionment"'8
Opponents of congressional action limiting state unitary taxation
frequently argue that businesses engaged in interstate commerce
must pay their fair share of state taxes and the unitary method is an
accurate means to calculate the fair tax liability.189 Their arguments
against uniform federal legislation eliminating unitary taxation of
corporations with foreign parents include: (1) constitutionality of re-
stricting state taxing power, (2) general considerations of federalism,
(3) the resulting loss in state revenue for the states, (4) the problems
involved in state" administration of the arms-length method, and (5)
the creation of unfair advantages for "big business."190
The constitutionality argument has been settled above in favor of
uniform legislation.191 Opponents of the legislation argue the propo-
sal would limit state sovereignty, 92 and may serve as precedent for
further encroachment on state taxing power.193
These arguments however, do not justify congressional inaction.
First, the Moorman Court noticed these concerns when it suggested
a uniform law. The Court expressly required that "due considera-
tions [be] given to the interests of all attached States," 194 as a pre-
requisite to passage of uniform laws. Therefore, opponents of the
measure need not be concerned that Congress will run roughshod
over state sovereignty.1 95
188. See generally House Hearings, supra note 15. The importance of state power
to employ unitary taxation has been evident not only by the recent Supreme Court litiga-
tion but also by recent congressional attempts to enact such legislation.
189. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977); Northwest-
ern States Portland Cement Company v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Opponents of
the legislation point out that only where state taxation substantially burdens interstate
commerce will the Commerce Clause restrict state taxing methods.
190. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 11-12 (statement of William Craven).
191. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. 267, 280 (1978).
192. See Parnell, supra note 175, at 230.
193. Id.
194. 437 U.S. at 280. The court implies in Moorman that congressional failure to
consider state interests would destroy the constitutionality of such a law.
195. Any congressional exercise of the commerce power necessarily concerns the
policies of federalism and comity. However, the Court implies in Moorman that there is
a strong national interest that may justify enactment of the uniform measure. Id.; cf.
Parnell, supra note 175, at 248-49. Mr. Parnell suggests that any restrictions on the
states prohibiting the use of unitary taxation would severely restrict the state taxing
power and should be declared an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power. This
fails, however, to take cognizance of the likelihood that unitary taxation as applied to
foreign-based corporations is unconstitutional. On the basis of this unconstitutionality of
the state tax, the author suggests that congressional action would not be unconstitutional.
The third point of opposition is the inherent decrease in state reve-
nues. 196 Estimates of such losses range as high as $485 million for
California alone.19 7 However, the decrease in state revenues might
be offset by increases in in-state investment and state tax revenues
incited by abandonment of the unitary method.1 98 Furthermore, pro-
ponents argue that the increased income from use of the unitary
method results from a distortion of income and should not be re-
ceived by the states.199
Another argument advanced in opposition to the legislation is the
onerous problem incurred in administering the arms-length
method.200 Proponents, however, have suggested that the congres-
sional act include a provision providing the states the access to the
Internal Revenue Service audits employing the arms-length method.
This provision would greatly reduce the administrative burden on the
states.2o'
Opponents of the proposal also argue that the measure would pro-
vide to foreign corporations an unfair advantage over state and local
business.20 2 They point to the manipulation by taxpayers that often
Members of the European Community do not view the question as one of "states'
rights," but as a failure of the United States to live up to its double-taxation treaties.
DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 242, G-8 (1983).
196. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 11 (statement of William Craven).
197. Id. at 34-35 (statement of Kenneth Cory); cf. DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA),
No. 40, G-4 (1984) where there is some question raised as to the accuracy of the $500
million figure.
198. House Hearings, supra note 15, at 139, 141-44 (statement of Senator Charles
McC. Mathias, Jr.).
199. Id. at 4-6 (statement of Donald C. Lubick, Asst. Sec. of Treasury). Mr.
Lubick furnished an example of a California banking enterprise causing $707,000 before
taxes. When the state applied unitary apportionment on the basis of a questionable con-
struction of "unitary business," the income was increased to $4,832,000. Therefore, the
tax was $560,000, or a 79% tax rate. See San Diego Daily Transcript, Feb. 13, 1984, at
IA, WI 5-6 (Kyocera Corp was taxed at 101% on California income when the apportion-
ment formula was applied).
200. House Hearings, supra note 15, at 11 (statement of William Craven). One
committee report has asserted that the problems encountered at the federal level would
make the arms-length method "virtually impossible to administer at the state level."
House Comm. ON WAYS & MEANS, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., RECOMMENDATION OF THE
TASK FORCE ON FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME (Comm. Print 1977).
Chief among these problems is the enforcement effort requiring the Commissioner to
recalculate the taxpayer's liability based on arms-length pricing.
201. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 146 (statement of Charles W.
Wheeler). The provision'would also remedy the state's potential inability to negotiate
with foreign governments because the federal government has the requisite power to en-
gage in the necessary negotiations. Cf. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51
U.S.L.W. 4987, 4996 n.31 (U.S. June 27, 1983).
In addition, major trading partners have indicated a willingness to provide greater
cooperation with taxing authorities if the unitary system is abandoned. DAILY TAX RE-
PORTER (BNA), No. 59; G-7 (1984).
202. House Hearings, supra note 15, at 34-35 (statement of Kenneth Cory). The
advantage for big business is that by operating in many jurisdictions it can manipulate
its tax liability through its divisions while small unijurisdictional businesses have no such
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occurs with the arms-length method.203 However, the alternative
method is unitary apportionment which creates actual multiple taxa-
tion on instrumentalities of foreign commerce. The legislator is faced
with balancing the threat of manipulation against the certainty of
unconstitutional multiple taxation. With the assistance of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service audits, the balance swings to favor the
legislation.
Policies Supporting Enactment of Uniform Legislation
The policy arguments supporting uniform legislation include: (1)
the excessive administrative burden placed upon foreign parents cre-
ated by unitary taxation, (2) the distortion of income levels and
taxes through use of unitary taxation, (3) the multiple problem, (4)
problems with finding a suitable definition for "unitary business,"
(5) the disastrous effects upon federal trade policies brought by state
unitary taxation, and (6) Congress is uniquely situated to strike a
delicate policy balance, and the Supreme Court has committed the
issue to Congress.
Proponents argue the individual filing requirements for state tax
returns employing the unitary apportionment method place an exces-
sive administrative burden upon foreign parent corporations that is
not equally shared by corporations with domestic parents. 204 The ad-
ministrative burdens may be grouped into five categories: (1) conver-
sion into United States dollars and accounting principles, 20 5 (2) re-
evaluation of properties held by the corporations, 20 6 (3) difficulties
incurred in complying with disclosure requirements, 20 7 (4) lack of
uniformity among the states, and (5) substantial compliance costs.208
For corporations with foreign parents, substantial administrative
burdens arise from the requirements that all values be converted into
United States dollars and accepted United States accounting princi-
opportunities.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 5 (statement of Donald C. Lubick). Mr. Lubick notes that if a foreign
nation such as Japan were to employ unitary taxation it would be an impossible burden
to cope with for the U.S. corporations operating there. Further, Mr. Lubick suggests that
the result would make it very difficult for the U.S. to continue as an important nation in
world commerce.
205. Id. at 92-94 (California Guidelines).
206. Id. Properties must be valued in United States dollars.
207. See infra text accompanying note 212.
208. For purpose of analysis, this Comment refers to the California reporting
guidelines appearing in the House Hearings.
pies be used.2"9 This requirement has been described as the source of
a "horrendous" administrative burden for those corporations with
foreign parents. 210 In some instances, the cost of compliance may
even be greater than the tax itself.211
One of the most sensitive areas of discord concerning employment
of the unitary tax method is the requirement that the parent disclose
all information to the taxing authority.212 The problem is that many
foreign governments have extensive secrecy laws regarding defense
contracts restricting the publication of certain information. 21 s Recon-
ciling these requirements results in an "operational nightmare" for
foreign parents. 14
Furthermore, the costs incurred in preparing one type of return
for the federal tax employing the internationally accepted method
and then a separate return for states employing unitary taxation
have caused disruption in trade and resulted in protest leveled by the
Common Market countries.
Another argument advanced for the uniform legislation is the dis-
tortion of income levels and taxes for the United States-based sub-
sidiaries created by the apportionment.2 15 The unitary apportionment
theory assumes that the rate of return is uniform among the taxing
jurisdictions.210  Although this assumption is valid when applied
among the various states, it does not apply on a multinational
level.217 The result of unitary apportionment of worldwide income is
that when a higher return on overseas operations exists, more income
is apportioned to the taxing state than actually earned there.21 8
209. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 92. For example, a European-based
worldwide corporation with subsidiaries operating in California would prepare its ac-
counting reports based on those principles and currency values of the parent's home
country, However, in order to comply with state unitary taxation, all values must be
converted into United States dollars and all accounting must be reconsidered to insure
compliance with United States accounting principles. Such an extreme burden will have
to be endured even if the foreign corporation operates over 100 subsidiaries with only one
operation in a unitary taxation state. Id. at 165 (statement of Paul W. Cook).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 360 (letter from Paolo Pansa Cedronio). Furthermore, the costs in-
curred in preparing one type of return for the federal tax, employing the internationally
accepted method, and then a separate return for states employing unitary taxation have
caused disruption in trade and resulted in protest leveled by the Common Market coun-
tries. Id.
212. Id. at 226 (statement by D.B. Hammond).
213. E.g., Capitol Industries-EMI, Inc. v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 570 (1983). See infra note 232.
214. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 226 (statement of D.B. Hammond).
215. See supra note 199.
216. House Hearings, supra note 15, at 146 (statement of Charles W. Wheeler).
217. Id. at 4 (statement of Donald C. Lubick). This is because much larger salary
and property values present in the U.S. distort the ratios resulting in exaggerated values
from the three-factor formula. Once the income is distorted, so is the tax liability. See
also statement of Dallas A. Hurston at 194; and supra note 60.
218. House Hearings, supra note 15, at 146 (statement of Charles W. Wheeler).
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The actual multiple taxation problem, acknowledged by the Su-
preme Court in Container, has been cited by proponents as another
reason supporting congressional limitation. The Common Market
countries have urged Congress to enact legislation limiting unitary
apportionment and double taxation to relieve the multiple
taxation. 19
Lack of a uniform definition of "unitary business" and uniformity
among state reporting guidelines have also been mentioned to justify
legislation. In light of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the "three
unities" 220 test and reliance on "functional integration" in Mobil and
Exxon, the first question seems largely moot.221 However, serious ad-
ministrative burdens result from nonuniform "unitary business" defi-
nitions.222 In addition to the problems incurred in conversion and re-
evaluation, the problems are magnified when the subsidiaries operate
in many states employing different definitions and reporting
guidelines. 23
Proponents of federal legislation argue that in federal foreign
trade policy concerns, the same concerns supporting the "one voice"
requirement in Japan Line support congressional limitations. First,
continual state use of unitary taxation may result in worldwide retal-
iation against United States corporations with operations .abroad.2
Opponents of federal legislation suggest that although the values are distorted, United
States labor may have contributed to the high rate of return in the foreign countries.
Proponents counter arguing that such results are at best arbitrary and inequitable and
should not be employed to calculate a fair tax base. Id. at 309 (statement of Joseph H.
Guttentag).
219. Id. at 360 (letter from Paolo Pansa Cedronio). Opponents may counter that
as recognized in Container, the arms-length method itself is no absolute guarantee
against multiple taxation. Proponents argue that it is not the effect of multiple taxation
alone, but the combination of multiple taxation with other factors that justifies limiting
legislation. Id. at 146 (statement of Charles W. Wheeler). See DAILY TAX REPORTER
(BNA), No. 242, G-7, G-8 (1983) & No. 29, G-4, G-5 (1984) (protests of the United
Kingdom and Japan).
220. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
221. This is because the Supreme Court has accepted at best the "three unities"
and the "functional integration" tests. See supra note 10.
222. See supra note 214.
223. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 191 (statement of Thomas J. Mc-
Hugh). Mr. McHugh provides many examples of the ambiguities involved in state uni-
tary taxation.
224. Id. at 137-38 (statement of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.). Continual
use could lead other countries which have rejected the method to now accept it to in-
crease their tax revenues. See L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1984, at 3, col. 1, concerning such an
effort being undertaken by Japanese companies.
The British Parliament is now considering a retaliatory measure against United States-
based corporations. DAILY TAx REPORTER (BNA), No. 242, G-7, G-8 (1983).
Second, foreign investment is plainly discouraged.22 5 Third, the
method is incompatible with the internationally accepted method
employed by the federal government.226 Fourth, and most significant,
is the direct impediment that state unitary taxation places in the way
of federal treaty negotiations.227
Congress plays a unique role in this controversy. First, the Su-
preme Court has committed the problem to Congress, 228 and Presi-
dent Reagan has formed a task force to study the problem.229 Addi-
tionally, Congress appears to be the only branch of federal
government that can provide the forum for extensive debating, fact
finding, and weighing of competing state and national interests230
prior to enacting legislation.231 Congress should investigate the possi-
ble solutions available and consider enactment of uniform legislation
prohibiting state unitary taxation of subsidiaries of foreign corpora-
tions unless the states voluntarily agree to employ a different mode
of taxation.
CONCLUSION
The recent constitutional challenges to state unitary taxation lev-
eled by domestic-based multinational corporations reveal the tests
applied by the Supreme Court to Due Process and Commerce Clause
objections. Although the foreign parent corporation is itself pre-
cluded from litigating any claim with respect to the tax, the domes-
tic subsidiary may press its claims, but only in the state courts. Ap-
plication of the appropriate tests reveal that the application of
unitary taxation to domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations is a
violation of the negative implications of the Commerce Clause. Prac-
tical considerations, however, limit the effectiveness of selecting liti-
gation as the alternative to pursue to avoid consequences of unitary
taxation.
The Supreme Court has committed to Congress the delicate bal-
225. House Hearings, supra note 15, at 137-38 (statement of Senator Charles
McC. Mathias, Jr.).
226. Id. at 291 (statement of John S. Nolan).
227. See, supra note 128 and accompanying text. In addition to the treaty with the
United Kingdom, other treaties with major trading parties have been jeopardized by
state employment of unitary tax principles. Proponents argue strongly that states' use of
unitary apportionment in contrast to the federal government and other nations has pre-
cipitated foreign trade cohflicts and requires congressional action. House Hearings, supra
note 15, at 292 (statement of John S. Nolan).
228. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978).
229. DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 186, G-1 (1983).
230. See GAO, supra note 169 at 160-61.
231. In addition to the policy expressed in Moorman, see Chief Justice Burger's
consent in ASARCO. The Chief Justice consented to those judgments only in reliance
upon the Court's expressed statement that the Court's holding would not preclude future
congressional action in this area. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r, 458 U.S.
307 (1982).
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ancing process that must be engaged in prior to passing any limiting
legislation. Both proponents and opponents of pre-emptive legislation
have suggested formidable policy considerations. In light of the un-
constitutionality of the tax as applied to foreign-based corporations
the balance favors the limiting legislation.
Pre-emptive legislation as a remedy, however, deals a harsh blow
to the states. Therefore, the best compromise would be to pass legis-
lation providing for increased state access to Internal Revenue Ser-
vice audits, increased state information exchange, and better IRS
policing of transactions, without directly limiting unitary taxation.
This method will allow the states to repeal voluntarily their unitary
statutes without suffering from corporate manipulation. 3 2 In addi-
tion, it will supply the states necessary time to implement other sys-
tems to provide for losses in revenue. At the close of a congression-
ally imposed period, the Congress must pass pre-emptive legislation
prohibiting unitary taxation of foreign-based corporations.
This system will place the burden on the states because they are
now employing an unconstitutional tax. In the interests of states'
rights, it will allow the states considerable freedom to plan alterna-
tive tax policy prior to the ban, and result in equal treatment of all
multinationals. Additionally, it will put an end to an unconstitutional
tax and restore good relations with our foreign trading partners.
DOUGLAS M. VENTURA
232. The United Kingdom and several other trading partners have suggested they
will provide more tax information if the states will abandon the unitary tax concept.
DAILY TAX REPORTER (BNA), No. 59, G-7 (1984).

